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STATE POLICE CASH SUBSISTENCE
ALLOWANCES AND SECTION 119 OF THE
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
Koerner v. United States*
INTRODUCTION
The well-known objective of the federal income tax is to tax all
income regardless of the source of that income.' The collection
power assigned to Congress is expressed through the Internal
Revenue Code.' In the exclusion section of the Code Congress in-
dicated that some types of income should escape taxation and, conse-
quently, listed sources of income that are specifically excluded from
computations of federal tax liability.' The impact of the Code is that
unless an item is specifically excluded, it is to be included in gross
income.'
One item of excluded income in §119 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 is "meals furnished for the convenience of the
employer. ' 5 A further refinement of this exclusion was considered in
the recent case of Koerner v. United States." In Koerner the Fourth
*550 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir. 1977), petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3754 (U.S.
May 5, 1977) (No. 76-1539).
1. U. S. CONST., Amend. XVI. The amendment reads as follows:
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes,
from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several
States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.
2. Title 26 of the United States Code pertains to the Internal Revenue Code.
3. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§101-124.
4. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §61.
5. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §119 provides:
There shall be excluded from gross income of an employee the
value of any meals .. .furnished to him by his employer for the conve-
nience of the employer, but only if-
(1) in the case of meals, the meals are furnished on the business
premises of the employer ....
In determining whether meals . . .are furnished for the con-
venience of the employer the provisions of an employment
contract or of a State statute fixing terms of employment shall
not be determinative of whether the meals ... are intended as
compensation.
6. 550 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir. 1977), petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3754
(U.S. May 5, 1977) (No. 76-1539).
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Circuit Court of Appeals determined that cash subsistence
allowances for the cost of meals of an on-duty state policeman are
beyond the meaning of the statute and are therefore a proper inclu-
sion in income. Interpretation of §119 lies at the center of the con-
troversy surrounding exclusion of such cash subsistence allowances.
A liberal interpretation of this statute utilizing the doctrine of con-
venience to the employer justifies the exclusion. However, a strict
interpretation based on the entire statute would include such
payments in gross income.
In light of these divergent interpretations, §119, as it relates to
meals furnished for the convenience of the employer in the form of
cash subsistence allowances, will be discussed by examining the con-
flicting interpretations of Congress, the Internal Revenue Service,
and the courts, culminating with the problems to be encountered as
the Supreme Court of the United States reviews the application of
the statute in the October 1977 term.' A review of the facts in
Koerner will set the stage for discussing §119 and cash subsistence
allowances.
FACTS OF THE CASE
Koener v. United States was a refund action in the United
States District Court of West Virginia,' brought by a West Virginia
state policeman against the United States for refund of income taxes
and assessed interest for the years 1967, 1968, and 1969.' Trooper
Koerner claimed that the history of the cash subsistence system of
the police department clearly indicated that the payments were for
7. Other cases on the issue of cash subsistence payments that are awaiting
U.S. Supreme Court review are Kowalski v. CIR, 544 F.2d 686 (3rd Cir. 1976), cert.
granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3651 (U.S. Mar. 28, 1977) (No. 75-1095) (cash payments exclusion
allowed for New Jersey state trooper); and U.S. v. Smith, 543 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1976),
petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3643 (U.S. Mar. 7, 1977) (No. 75-1243) (cash
payments exclusion allowed for Mississippi Highway patrolman).
8. There were three courts open to a taxpayer to litigate a tax dispute: the
U.S. Tax Ct., the U.S. Dist. Ct., and the U.S. Ct. of Claims. However, the U.S. Dist. Ct.
has jurisdiction over cases only arising in a tax deficiency which barred Koerner from
filing for a refund. The U.S. Court of Claims had jurisdiction, but the only appeal from
an adverse decision was to the U.S. Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari. Writs of
certiorari from the U.S. Court of Claims are granted at the rate of about one per year.
Therefore, the U.S. District Court was the better forum for Koerner. M. GARBIS AND
A. SCHWAIT, TAX REFUND LITIGATION 14-19 (ALI-ABA Taxation/Practice Handbook
1971).
9. The complaint was filed by Morgan P. Koerner and Juanita B. Koerner,
however, Juanita B. Koerner was a party only by virtue of the joint return provision
of INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §6013 for the years in question.
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the convenience of his employer and, therefore, should be excluded
from his gross income under §119.20 Trooper Koerner showed that he
had received cash subsistence payments for meals eaten on duty at
a restaurant of his choice. However, he remained under the control
of the police department since he was required to report the time
and the location to his superior." Reporting to his superior allowed
the department to contact him in the event of an emergency. Being
on emergency call while eating supported Trooper Koerner's conten-
tion that the meals were for the convenience of his employer and
not for his own convenience. Also, the fact that Trooper Koerner
received checks separate from payroll covering the actual number of
days on duty" was evidence that the payments were not additional
compensation for work performed, but an allowance in lieu of receiv-
ing food in kind from the department. Since the cash relieved the
department from preparing meals, but permitted them to maintain
control of the troopers, and since the cash was not for additional ser-
vices rendered, Trooper Koerner made his claim for exclusion from
the position that the payments were for the convenience of his
employer.
The district court agreed with Officer Koerner and held that
the cash subsistence allowances were excludable.'" Although the
government contended that the meals failed to meet the "in kind"
requirement of the statute, the court answered that on the basis of
United States v. Barrett" the meals did not have to be "in kind.""
The government further argues that the "on the employer's
10. During the initial years of operation of the West Virginia Department of
Public Safety (State Police Department) the troopers lived and ate at barracks provid-
ed by the state so that troopers on 24-hour call would be available at all times. As the
Department expanded, the administrative burden of the arrangement increased to a
point where the state economies required that cash payments be given to troopers in
lieu of providing quarters and meals. In effect, it was cheaper for the state to make
payments than provide in kind. Paying the subsistence not only relieved the Depart-
ment of the burden of providing eating facilities, but also gave the state the additional
benefit of having constant patrols on the highways which eliminated the problem of un-
patroled areas while troopers went back to the barracks to eat. 404 F. Supp. 1128,
1129-30 (S.D.W. Va. 1975).
11. Koerner received subsistence at the rate of $5.50 per day for 1967 and
$5.75 per day for 1968-1969. Koerner v. U.S., 404 F. Supp. at 1130.
12. These payments were not considered compensation by the state of West
Virginia. Id. at 1130. However, the intent of the state was not determinative of an ex-
clusion according to INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §119. See note 5 supra.
13. Id. at 1132.
14. Id. at 1131.
15. 321 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1963) (Cash allowances held excludable for Miss.
Highway Patrol). To include cash allowances within the definition of meals, the Barrett
court relied on a pre-1954 Code decision which said:
1977]
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premises" requirement was not satisfied. The district court respond-
ed by citing Morelan v. United States"6 and Barrett. Based on this
authority, the court held that in such situations the Commissioner's
interpretation of business premises was too narrow and unrealistic
since the "business premises" includes the entire state." Finally, the
district court relied on the doctrine of convenience of the employer
as the key determinant of an exclusion of cash subsistence
allowances under §119.1' Following this test the district court held
"that the record . . . conclusively shows that the meals for which a
cash subsistence is paid were furnished on the business premises of
the employer at the convenience of the employer."'9
On appeal the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
district court's determination that the cash subsistence allowances
were excludable from gross income.' Rather than analyzing the
facts to determine the meaning of §119, the court used the aproach
of interpreting the statute and then applying the facts to that inter-
pretation. The outcome of this analysis was the denial of the §119
exclusion.
The court of appeals formed the foundation for reversal on the
premise that no deductions are allowed unless authorized by
statute.2' Building on this premise the court determined that the
The rationale of the rule should make it applicable to determine the
extent of gross income either when quarters and meals are furnished in
kind or cash is paid in lieu thereof .... Admittedly, the payment of cash
to an employee is normally compensatory and probably more obviously so
than payment in kind. Nevertheless, just as an employee is often furnish-
ed tangible property which cannot be regarded as compensation, an
employee may be furnished cash which is not compensation.
Saunders v. Comm'r, 215 F.2d 768, 771 (3rd Cir. 1954) (Decided in 1954, but under the
1939 Int. Rev. Code).
16. 237 F. Supp. 879, 884 (D. Minn. 1965), affd 356 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1966).
17. 404 F. Supp. at 1131. The Morelan court said the government's argument
that the meals were not on the business premises is good in theory, however,
realistically the business premises of the state extend over the entire state and par-
ticularily to the highways where the policemen worked. 237 F. Supp. at 884. Barrett
added: "In view of the special nature and functions of the highway trooper's work, it is
unrealistic to treat the employer's place of business as limited to the state patrol head-
quarters." 321 F.2d at 912.
18. Id. at 1132.
19. Id.
20. Koerner v. U.S., 550 F.2d 1362, 1363-64 (4th Cir. 1977), petition for cert.
filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3754 (U.S. May 5, 1977) (No. 76-1539).
21. Id. at 1363. See CIR v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 49 (1949); Helvering v. Nor-
thwest Steel Mills, 311 U.S. 46, 49 (1940.
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guideline for interpretation was to strictly construe the authorized
deductions.' Utilizing these rules for statutory construction, the
first part of §119 construed was "furnished on the business premises
of the employer." Emphasizing the strict construction approach, the
court in one swift sentence stated, "The plaintiffs while engaged in
their duties concededly are not furnished meals 'on the business
premises of the employer.' " In view of the fact that the initial term
of the statute was breached, the appellate court found that the sub-
sistence payments "clearly" did not satisfy the requirements of
§119." Finding the district court approach inadequate since it follow-
ed the traditional approach of using the particular facts to define
the statute, the Fourth Circuit overturned the district court's deci-
sion by applying the strict interpretation of the statute to the facts
presented.
SECTION 119, MEALS FURNISHED FOR
THE CONVENIENCE OF THE EMPLOYER
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954, §119 provides:
There shall be excluded from gross income of an
employee the value of any meals . . . furnished to him by
his employer for the convenience of the employer, but on-
ly if-
(1) in the case of meals, the meals are furnished on
the business premises of the employer .... "'
The key phrases of the statute on which there have been conflicting
interpretations are "meals," "convenience of the employer," and
"furnished on the business premises of the employer." Each of the
22. I& The court freely interchanged the terms "exclusion" and "deduction,"
however, if strictly defined, an "exclusion" relates to specific items not included in
computing gross income. A "deduction" is that which is subtracted from gross income
to arrive at taxable income. E. GRISWOLD AND M. GRAETY, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
84 (1976). Therefore, if the court in discussing "meals" were to call the cash sub-
sistence allowances "exclusions," the applicable section is 119, but if the court uses the
term deduction, the controlling section is 162 as trade or business expenses, or 262,
pers~bnal living and family expenses.
23. The court must state that the subsistence payments are "clearly" not ex-
cludable to meet the requirements of CIR v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960), as follows:
[T]he judge's finding must stand unless "clearly erroneous." A finding
is "clearly erroneous" where although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.
Id at 291.
24. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §119.
1977]
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three branches of the federal government has interpreted these
terms. Congress expressed its intent through the congressional
reports which accompany the statutes when passed by the
legislature.' On the basis of these reports, the Internal Revenue
Service defined the statutes by publishing regulations, writing rul-
ings, and allowing or denying exclusions claimed under the statute.
The courts' application of the statute has resulted in a series of con-
flicting decisions. An examination of the reasoning of each branch
demonstrates the diverse approaches to §119.
Congressional Intent
A study of the House of Representatives Report and the
Senate Report indicates the congressional intent at the time of enac-
ting the statute." From these reports the intention of Congress ap-
pears to be that the section applies only to meals in kind,' that cash
allowances are includable in gross income to the extent they are
compensation,28 that the test of exclusion is whether the meals are
primarily employer convenience or employee convenience," and that
meals are excluded only if furnished on the business premises of the
employer.' The major test of balancing the convenience of employer
or employee seems to be applicable only after the income is deter-
mined to be in the form of meals and on the business premises. The
report expresses the test as being more than the employer conve-
25. The Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives initially
works out the details of a revenue bill. Then the passed bill is sent to the Senate ac-
companied by a committee report justifying the action taken. The Finance Comittee of
the Senate revises a bill to fit its desires and also prepares a report. If there are dif-
ferences between the two committees, a Joint Conference Committee resolves any dif-
ferences and drafts the final bill which, if passed and signed, becomes the law. The
committee reports of the House, Senate, and Conference Committees are important
since they contain the congressional intent and help to explain the technical aspects of
the law. Both the Internal Revenue Service and the courts rely on the committee
reports to interpret the law. J. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 10 (2d ed. 1973).
For §119 the House Report is reported at 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4175-76
(1954). However, the more significant report for this section is the Senate Report. Id.
at 4648, 4825-26. The differences between the two reports were resolved in favor of
the Senate version of the bill. Id. at 5286 (Conference Comm. Report).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 4825. See generally Fisher, Tax Free Income: Compensation in Kind
and Quasi-in-Kind, 5 WM. & MARY L. REV. 46 (1964).
28. Id
29. Id. at 4648.
30. Id. at 5286. The committee report uses the same language as the statute
implying that there is no other more specific phrase to convey the meaning "on the
business premises."
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nience doctrine alone, but including the application of the doctrine in
specific meal contexts.3'
Internal Revenue Service
Another source of interpretation of §119 can be found in the in-
come tax regulations promulgated by the Internal Revenue Service
(hereinafter IRS)." Although the regulations dealing with §119
parallel many of the requirements for exclusion in the congressional
report, they omit the balancing test of convenience to employer or
employee. Essentially, the IRS looks only at the convenience of the
employer after establishing that the meals are "in kind" and "on the
business premises."' Further, the regulations go beyond the con-
gressional report to define the term "business premises of the
employer" as the place of employment of the employee. 3' The IRS
position follows the congressional intent that cash allowances are in-
cludable to the extent they are compensation."
In addition to the regulations, the Internal Revenue Service
presents its policies concerning administering the tax laws through
31. An examination of other Int. Rev. Code sections implies that when Con-
gress intended an exclusion of both amounts received for services and the value of ser-
vices received, it stated that intent by specifically stating such in the statute. See, e.g.,
§107 (A clergyman is not taxed on either a residence furnished to him or any cash
allowance which he uses for rent or to provide a home); § 117 (Scholarship and
fellowship grant recipients are not taxed on fees, services, or allowances for expenses
received); §120 (1976) (Employees may exclude the value of personal legal services or
amounts received as reimbursements for such services if under a qualified plan).
32. Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1 (1964) provides in part:
(a) Meals. (1) The value of meals furnished to an employee by his
employer shall be excluded from the employee's gross income if two tests
are met: (i) The meals are furnished on the business premises of the
employer, and (ii) the meals are furnished for the convenience of the
employer.
33. Treas. Reg. §1.119-1 (1964) provides in part:
(c) Rules. (1) For purposes of this section, the term business
premises of the employer generally means the place of employment of the
employee .... (2) The exclusion provided by section 119 applies only to
meals . . . furnished in kind by an employer to his employee. If the
employee has an option to receive additional compensation in lieu of meals
• . .in kind, the value of such meals . . . is not excluded from gross in-
come. However, the mere fact that an employee, at his option, may
decline to accept meals tendered in kind will not of itself require inclusion
of the value thereof in gross income. Cash allowances for meals . ..
received by an employee are includible in gross income to the extent that
such allowances constitute compensation.
34. l&
35. 1&
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the use of periodic publications. 6 Regarding §119 the IRS issued a
Technical Information Release (TIR)"7 which states that the IRS
refuses to follow past court decisions which allowed cash allowances
as exclusions." Foremost among the reasons for contradicting these
decisions are the self-promulgated regulations relating to §119," that
police should receive the same tax treatment for allowances as other
taxpayers, and the repeal of §120 which, seemingly, is a congres-
sional response ending favorable legislation for police officials.
In interpreting §119 the IRS promulgated regulations as guided
by congressional intent. Consequently, when circuit court opinions
clashed with the regulations, the IRS denounced those contrary deci-
sions. With this stalemate between the IRS and the courts the effect
appears to be that the taxpayer should follow the regulation unless
he would rather go to court to possibly obtain an exclusion.
Judicial Interpretation
Upon choosing to take his case to court, a taxpayer will receive
various constructions depending on the circuit court in which he
36. See generally L. REDMAN AND J. QUIGGLE, PROCEDURE BEFORE THE INTER-
NAL REVENUE SERVICE 39-65 (5th ed. 1974).
37. TIR's are used by the IRS to speed the dissemination of information to
the public without the formalities of other sources. The TIR's often include an-
nouncements of proposed changes in regulations, the position of the IRS on a district
or circuit court decision, advance notice of Revenue Rulings, announcements of hear-
ings of proposed rulemaking, or the requirements of newly enacted legislation. Id. at
50-51.
38. TIR No. 741 (Jun. 21, 1965), [1961-65 Rulings] MERTEN'S LAW OF FED. INC.
TAXATION 378 (M.A. 625). The IRS will not follow the decisions of Barrett and
Saunders.
39. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
40. Special treatment was given state policemen under §120:
(a) GENERAL RULE- Gross income does not include any amount
received as a statutory subsistence allowance by an individual who is
employed as a police official by a state....
However, this section was repealed by the TECHNICAL AMENDMENT ACT OF 1958, 72
STAT. 1607 (1958), when Congress felt that states were changing their systems of com-
pensation to allow their state policemen to take advantage of the exclusion. [Code
Commentary] MERTEN'S LAW OF FED. INC. TAXATION §120. This was construed by the
IRS as congressional intent that state policemen should not be given a special inter-
pretation of §119 for cash subsistence allowances. The 1976 amendments to the 1954
Code reinstated §120, however, this new section which regards an exclusion of
amounts received under qualified group legal services plans should not be confused
with the 1954 Code §120. See generally Comment, Taxation-Statutory Subsistence
Allowances Paid to Highway Patrolmen Are Excludable From Gross Income, Not-
withstanding the Repeal of Section 120 of the Internal Revenue Code, 18 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 138 (1966).
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files suit. By a plain reading of the statute, it would appear logically
inconsistent to hold that cash payments should be considered
"meals." The employer gives the employee money to eat where he
wants, usually prohibiting him from eating on the premises. In ac-
tuality, the employer gives the employee the money as an induce-
ment not to eat on the premises. Nevertheless, four circuits
recognize cash allowances as excludable under §119.1
Adopting a part of the expressed congressional intent, these
courts use the balancing test (benefit to the employer against
benefit to the employee), but disregard the more critical elements of
the specific definitions of "meals in kind" and "furnished on the
premises." Using the facts to define these terms seems to be the ap-
proach utilized. Consequently, court opinions in effect look only to
the doctrine of convenience of employer as a basis for the decisions.
Early decisions under the 1939 Internal Revenue Code did not
provide for a §119-type exclusion as did the court decisions under
the 1954 Code. Therefore, when the convenience of employer doc-
trine was applied in the pre-1954 Code cases' there was no need to
discuss whether the definition of meals included cash allowances or
whether the meals should have been on the premises of the
employer. Generally, those courts looked at the circumstances of the
cases and determined if the cash allowances were paid for the
employer's convenience; if they were then the trooper was allowed
an exclusion from gross income.
Following enacment of the 1954 Code the courts continued to
decide cases solely on the convenience doctrine as developed under
the 1939 Code. An attempt to fulfill the Code requirements for
meals and premises was unsuccessful. To achieve the statutory goal,
Barrett' broadened the business premises requirement to include
"every road and highway" and declared that the premises require-
ment "not decisive against the excludability" of the allowances."
41. Kowalski v. CIR, 544 F.2d 686 (3rd Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W.
3651 (U.S. Mar. 28, 1977) (No. 76-1095); Smith v. U.S., 543 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1976),
petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3643 (U.S. Mar. 7, 1977) (No. 76-1243); U.S. v. Bar-
rett, 321 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1963); Morelan v. U.S., 356 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1966); U.S. v.
Keeton, 383 F.2d 429 (10th Cir. 1967).
42. Saunders allowed an exclusion for cash allowances to N.J. troopers;
Magness v. Comm'r, 247 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1957), cert denied, 355 U.S. 931 (1958)
(denied exclusion by distinguishing facts from Saunders); Hyslope v. Comm'r, 21 T.C.
131 (1953) (denied exclusion for Indiana State Trooper who received monthly amount
regardless of time on duty).
43. U.S. v. Barrett, 321 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1963).
44. 321 F.2d 911, 912 (5th Cir. 1963).
19771
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The effect was to convert the 1954 Code into the pre-1954 test.
Likewise, Morelan" took the meals in kind requirement and expand-
ed it to include cash allowances by stating that to allow meals only
as exclusions would be "straining too much in the interest of effi-
cient tax collection."'" The court, in effect, rewrote the statute when
it used a test of classifying the payments as reimbursements or com-
pensation to decide excludability, rather than using the §119 re-
quirement of meals."7 The test used in Morelan was not a court in-
terpretation of the statute, but a disregard of the terms in the
statute. In order to fit the payments within the scope of the statute
the courts were, on the surface, applying the statute by redefining
the terms "meals" and "business premises" to fit the circumstances
of the case. The defect in such an application appears to be that the
underlying basis for decisions continued to be the convenience doc-
trine.
Judicial interpretation using only the convenience doctrine bas-
ed on the individual facts continued until the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Wilson v. United States, 8 recognized for the first time
that the proper approach to determining excludability was to read
the statute, interpret its meaning irrespective of the factual situa-
tion, and then apply the statute to the facts of the case."" Eventual-
ly, Koerner was to use a similar approach in its strict interpretation
of §119.
The Wilson court read the statute as "excluding the value of
any meals furnished to [employee] by his employer for the conve-
nience of the employer, but only if the meals were furnished on the
business premises of the employer."' The taxpayer, however,
wanted the court to read the statute as establishing an exclusion for
"the cost of any meals repaid by his employer if for the convenience
of the employer the meals were eaten near the taxpayer's place of
work." By thus expanding the statute, Trooper Wilson wanted the
criteria to be the same as in prior court cases-an application of the
convenience doctrine alone. Rather than accept the broadened ver-
sion of the statute, the court very narrowly construed §119.
45. Morelan v. U.S., 356 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1966).
46. 356 F.2d 199, 203 (8th Cir. 1966).
47. Id. at 204.
48. 412 F.2d 694 (1st Cir. 1969).
49. Id. at 695-96.
50. Id. at 695.
51. Id.
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The Wilson court analyzed the term "meals furnished to him
by his employer" and determined that it meant strictly "meals""2
and not what the taxpayer would consider "meals purchased by him
from a third party, the cost of which was ultimately repaid by the
employer."' After interpreting §119, the court applied the statute in
its entirety including "meals in kind" and "on the business
premises," emphasizing more than just an application of the conve-
nience of employer test. Thus the Wilson court departed from prece-
dent and found that the cash subsistence payments were not an ex-
clusion from income under §119 contrary to what would have been
held in the other circuits."
Although the Wilson court had a solid basis for its decision, it
remained in the minority. When viewed in conjunction with the
Wilson holding, Koerner lends judicial support to the previously
non-judicial interpretations of §119. Consequently, after Koerner all
three branches concur, at least in part, on the interpretation of the
statute. Moreover, Koerner reaffirms that there should be no depar-
ture from a strict interpretation of the Code.
Summary of §119 Interpretation
Unlike the congressional intent expressed when §119 became
law and the unchanging IRS interpretation of the statute, the circuit
courts have divided into two opposing views concerning the ex-
52. In an analogous tax court case, Michael A. Tougher, Jr., 51 T.C. 737 (1969),
affd per curiam, 441 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 856 (1971), in which
groceries were in question as meals rather than cash payments, the court presented a
persuasive distinction between meals and items received in lieu of meals:
[U]nless there is a compelling reason to the contrary the words of a
statute must be given their ordinary and usual meaning. . . . The words
"meals" connotates to us food that is prepared for consumption at such
recognized occasions as breakfast, lunch, dinner, or supper, or the
equivalent thereof. It does not ordinarily mean a bag of potatoes, a tin of
coffee, a box of salt ... or an uncooked chicken.... In fact, the emphasis
in section 119 on the "convenience of the employer" suggests added sup-
port for giving the term "meals" its ordinary meaning. When an employer
furnishes a "meal" in its normal sense, he can control the time, place,
duration, value, and content of the meal to suit his convenience. These
elements of potential control, which are strong evidence that the
employer's convenience is involved, are lacking in a case such as this one,
where the employee merely purchases groceries. Thus it is quite consis-
tent with legislative intent not to extend the term "meals" to include
groceries.
Id. at 738.
53. 412 F.2d 694, 696 (1st Cir. 1969).
54. Id.
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cludability of a trooper's cash subsistence allowances. Even after the
Wilson decision was rendered by the First Circuit, two circuits used
the pre-Wilson approach of convenience of employer as the primary
test. In Kowalski v. CIR,1 the Third Circuit held in favor of an ex-
clusion in accord with the precedent set by its own circuit case,
Saunders v. Commissioner.5 Likewise, United States v. Smith57 was
decided by the Fifth Circuit after Wilson, but the court also follow-
ed intra-circuit precedent by upholding the previous Fifth Circuit
case, United States v. Barrett.' However, Barrett also based its opi-
nion on the pre-1954 decision of Saunders.
From the background of the split in the circuit decisions
emerges a clear trend to accurately interpret 119."9 Circuits from
Barrett through Smith have consistently applied the convenience of
the employer test, have erroneously followed a pre-1954 case,
Saunders, and have broadly interpreted §119. Conversely, the
Wilson and Koerner cases have followed congressional intent ex-
pressed by committee reports and the repeal of §120,' and in so do-
ing have also applied the IRS interpretation, and have strictly con-
strued the statute as required by the Supreme Court. 1 The end of
the exclusion for troopers appears to be near as the Supreme Court
first applies the statute to Kowalski" and, in turn, may apply it to
Smith and Koerner.
55. 544 F.2d 686 (3rd Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3651 (U.S. Mar. 28,
1977) (No. 76-1095).
56. 215 F.2d 768 (3rd Cir. 1954) (decided under the 1939 Code).
57. 543 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1976), petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3643
(U.S. Mar. 7, 1977) (No. 76-1243).
58. 321 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1963).
59. A breakdown of circuit court interpretations of §119 as to cash allowances
to troopers under the 1954 Code over the years demonstrates the conflicting decisions
leading up to Koerner:
Barrett (5th Cir. 1963) (excludable for Miss. Highway Patrol).
Morelan (8th Cir. 1966) (excludable for Minn. State Highway Patrol).
Keeton (10th Cir. 1967) (excludable for Colo. Highway Patrol).
Wilson (1st Cir. 1969) (includable for N.H. State Police).
Smith (5th Cir. 1974) (excludable for Miss. Highway Patrol).
Kowalski (3rd Cir. 1976) (excludable for N.J. State Police).
Koerner (4th Cir. 1977) (includable for W. Va. State Police).
60. See note 40 supra.
61. See CIR v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 49 (1949); Helvering v. Northwest Steel
Mills, 311 U.S. 46, 49 (1940).
62. 544 F.2d 686 (3rd Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3651 (U.S. Mar. 28,
1977) (No. 76-1095).




Koerner illustrates the procedure that should be followed as
the Supreme Court, in the October 1977 Term, reviews §119 and
cash subsistence allowances." In order to strictly apply the statute,
the only proper approach is to interpret the meaning of the
statutory terms and then apply the facts, rather than looking at the
facts to derive the meaning of the statute. Particularly, the Supreme
Court will have to look at the statute as a whole including the terms
"meals" and "on the business premises." Only after analysis of these
terms may the application of the convenience of the employer doc-
trine be made. Applying the convenience doctrine as the sole test
fails to meet the statutory requirements. State troopers should not
receive more favorable treatment for cash payments than other tax-
payers. Consequently, they should proceed as any other taxpayer
would be required, by deducting the payments as travel expenses,"
if eligible, in order to escape the taxes on the cash subsistence
allowances.
63. After this case comment went to press the United States Supreme Court
addressed state police cash subsistence allowances in CIR v. Kowalski, 46 U.S.L.W.
4015 (U.S. Nov. 29, 1977) (No. 76-1095). The Court held that:
a) §119 does not cover cash payments of any kind.
b) §119 applies only to meals or lodging furnished in kind.
c) Cash payments are included in income under §61 because to hold
otherwise would give cash payments a superior position over meals
in kind which are excluded by §119.
d) Congress decided troopers should not be in a preferred status
over other taxpayers when §120 was repealed.
The decision limits a state trooper to including the payments in income and attempting
a deduction for ordinary and necessary business expenses within §162.
64. See INT. REV. CODE §162 for the requirements for such deductions.
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